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Abstract: 
  The decline of coronary heart disease mortality in the United States and 
western Europe is one of the great accomplishments of modern public health and 
medicine.  Cardiologists and cardiovascular epidemiologists have devoted 
significant effort to disease surveillance and epidemiological modeling to 
understand its causes.  One unanticipated outcome of these efforts has been the 
detection of early warnings that the decline had slowed, plateaued, or even 
reversed.  These subtle signs have been interpreted as evidence of an 
impending public health catastrophe.  This paper traces the history of research 
on coronary heart disease decline and resurgence and situates it in broader 
narratives of public health catastrophism.  Juxtaposing the coronary heart 
disease literature alongside the narratives of emerging and re-emerging 
infectious disease helps to identify patterns in how public health researchers 
create data and craft them into powerful narratives of progress or pessimism.  
These narratives, in turn, shape public health policy. 
   2 
  Coronary heart disease (CHD) took a devastating toll on the United States 
in the twentieth century, killing more people than any other disease.  It remains 
the leading cause of death in most countries worldwide.  In the US, the epidemic 
peaked in the mid-1960s and has now fallen 60% from its zenith.  Similar 
declines have occurred throughout the developed world, from Finland to Australia.  
When this decline was first recognized in the 1970s, it became a cause of both 
celebration and inquiry.  In the four decades since that time, researchers have 
sought to determine who or what deserves credit for this decline.  They have 
developed systems of cardiovascular surveillance to collect data from large 
populations and they have designed sophisticated computer models to 
enumerate the relative contributions of risk factor reduction and health care in 
achieving this large-scale public health improvement.1 
  Efforts to explain the decline in cardiovascular mortality took a surprising 
twist in the 1980s, when the very mechanisms designed to analyze the decline 
revealed incredibly subtle signs of resurgence.  In certain groups in certain 
countries the decline of CHD has slowed, plateaued, or even reversed.  Some 
researchers fear that, for the first time, the next generation of Americans might 
live shorter, less healthy lives than their parents.2  Coupled with the ominous rise 
of CHD in low- and middle-income countries worldwide, the signs of reversed 
decline have fostered new narratives of an impending global CHD catastrophe. 
  Preliminary evidence of reversal, however, does not in itself spell 
catastrophe.  Several years from now we might look back on such reports merely 
as passing bumps in the road towards continuing global decline in cardiovascular   3 
mortality.  Or we might look back on these reports as harbingers of far, far worse 
health outcomes yet to come.  Epidemiological observations are rarely read as 
independent data points.  Instead, researchers recruit them into larger narratives 
of catastrophe and improvement. 
  In this article, we trace the history of research on CHD decline and 
reversal and situate it in the context of the broader academic and popular 
discourses on emerging infectious disease.  Late twentieth century public health 
narratives about communicable and non-communicable disease have both 
exhibited oscillations between narratives of progress and doom.  Their 
juxtaposition, read in light of the sociology of expectations, helps to identify 
patterns in how researchers create and respond to data.  Recognizing these 
patterns is crucial as the international community increasingly acknowledges the 
need to shift the goals of global health beyond HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria to 
meet the challenge of cardiovascular disease, cancer, diabetes, and mental 
illness.  The same data can support different public health narratives depending 
on the author’s vantage, agenda, and audience.  Interpretations function as 
projective tests: the stories that researchers tell give meaning to data such that 
even small signals, interpreted in the context of growing public health 
catastrophism take on great significance.  As epidemiological observations 
become the basis for national and global health policies, it is crucial that these 
policies not be overly determined by a rhetoric of fear alone. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Coronary Heart Disease   4 
  The common narrative of CHD in the twentieth century is a triumphalist 
one.  CHD rose from relative obscurity in the late nineteenth century to take a 
devastating toll in the twentieth.  By 1960 it killed one-third of all Americans, 
striking down men -- most visibly -- from every rank of society.  The first tidings of 
changing fortune came in 1964 when health officials reported a decline in CHD 
mortality in California.3  This good news, however, received little attention.  Well 
into the 1970s cardiologists and the national media continued to sound the alarm 
about the unstoppable rise of heart disease.  In March 1974, Los Angeles 
cardiologist Weldon Walker reported a “sign of spring” in JAMA, pointing out that 
age-adjusted CHD mortality rates had actually been declining in the United 
States since 1963. 4 
  Walker’s announcement was met with guarded enthusiasm: not everyone 
was certain whether the decline was real or not.  Frequent changes in diagnostic 
taxonomies made it difficult to track mortality trajectories over the twentieth 
century. To make matters worse, the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) had fallen several years behind in its work.  When it tried to catch up in 
the early 1970s by releasing a bolus of several years’ data, it was Walker, and 
not officials at the NCHS or the National Heart Lung Institute (NHLI), who first 
recognized the signal.5  By 1975 the biometrics unit at the NHLI had scrutinized 
its own data and was “prepared to believe that the recent decrease in CHD 
mortality is probably real.”6  Eager to reach consensus about the reality and 
causes of decline, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) called 
leading researchers to Bethesda in October 1978 for what became known as the   5 
“Decline Conference.”7  Participants agreed that the decline -- a 20% drop 
between 1968 and 1978 -- was indeed “real.”  But they were unable to answer 
the more difficult question: what had changed between 1960 and 1975 that might 
account for the decline? 
  Quite simply, the problem was that too many things had changed (Figure).  
The onset of decline in the 1960s had coincided with vigorous efforts to educate 
Americans about smoking, diet, and other CHD risk factors; with changes in 
medical care, including aggressive control of hypertension, coronary care units, 
and bypass surgery; and with the passage of Medicare and Medicaid.  Despite a 
century of debate within infectious disease epidemiology, ambiguity persisted 
about how to resolve the distinction between correlation and causation.  As 
cardiologist Jeremiah Stamler complained in 1978, “when such multiple socio-
medical trends evolve over the years, it is virtually impossible to make a definitive 
scientific assessment as to the role of each of them singly, and all of them 
together in causing the decline in mortality rates.”8  Skeptics cautioned that the 
decline might have been unrelated to any specific interventions.  As a Lancet 
editorial warned about the decline debate, “when John Snow removed the handle 
from the Broad Street pump the cholera epidemic which he was attempting to 
abort was already on the wane.”9 
  In the aftermath of the Decline Conference, cardiovascular 
epidemiologists -- an emerging community of researchers with training in 
medicine, epidemiology, or both, stationed in academic medical centers and 
various government agencies -- saw themselves as part of “a natural experiment   6 
of immense importance.”10  They felt an “urgent need for better information about 
the relative impact of each component if we are to make intelligent decisions 
about the allocation of scarce resources between competing programs.”11  Two 
distinct programs emerged from this commitment: epidemiological surveillance 
and epidemiological modeling.  Both sought to separate out the contributions of 
risk factor reduction and health care by determining whether decreased mortality 
was the result of successful prevention (e.g., reduced incidence) or treatment 
(e.g., reduced case-fatality). 
  After an initial pilot program that began in 1980, NIH launched 
Atherosclerosis Research in Communities (ARIC), a set of four cohort studies 
begun in 1983 that continues today.12  Researchers in North Carolina, Mississippi, 
Minnesota, and Maryland, each enrolled 4000 patients and monitored the 
occurrence of CHD events (e.g., heart attacks, sudden death), performed routine 
clinical exams, collected blood markers of atherosclerosis, and used vascular 
ultrasound to measure atherosclerosis in the carotid and (lower extremity) 
arteries.  Similarly motivated by the uncertain outcomes of the Decline 
Conference, researchers from the World Health Organization began to plan a 
surveillance program in 1979.  Their efforts culminated in MONICA (Multinational 
MONItoring of Trends and Determinants in CArdiovascular Disease).  
Researchers at 39 centers in 26 countries collected data from over 100,000 
patients on event rates, case-fatality rates, medical care, risk factors, and so 
forth.13  By collecting data on the incidence of heart attacks, both fatal and non-
fatal, the researchers hoped that they would discern whether prevention had   7 
reduced the incidence of heart disease or medical care had improved the survival 
of patients who developed it. 
  To generate data with sufficient granularity, these programs needed to 
focus on discrete, well-circumscribed populations, something that limited the 
generalizability of the findings.14  They struggled to standardize data collection 
across their various sites.  They had to take cause of death data at face value 
even though they knew that sites varied in their accuracy.  And once credible 
data emerged, researchers often disagreed about its interpretation, especially in 
light of the ecological fallacy.15  Nonetheless, by the time that NHLBI convened a 
workshop to follow up on the Decline Conference in 1988, data from ARIC and 
MONICA allowed robust comparisons of international trends in CHD mortality.  
CHD decline in the United States had accelerated in the 1980s, falling 4% each 
year.16  Optimism was tempered by emerging recognition of the growing burden 
of CHD in developing countries, and by continuing uncertainty about how to 
assign credit to prevention and medical care.17 Researchers worried that their 
initial assumptions may have been too simplistic: health care and prevention 
could each influence both event and case fatality rates, making it difficult to 
distinguish their relative impact.18  Decades of surveillance programs did not 
resolve debates about the causes of the decline.  Instead, data supported the 
original intuition that both prevention and treatment had contributed. 
  The Decline Conference also motivated a second strand of cardiovascular 
epidemiology, one that used sophisticated models to discern the causes of CHD 
decline.  These models were made possible not just by the improved data   8 
generated by surveillance programs and the on-going clinical trials of risk factor 
reduction and medical treatments, but also by rapid improvements in computer 
technology that made calculation-intensive analyses accessible to clinicians and 
researchers.  In 1984 Lee Goldman (a cardiologist) and Francis Cook (an 
epidemiologist) produce an integrated quantitative assessment of preventive and 
therapeutic interventions.  Their model recapitulated the passage of a CHD 
patient through the health care system, including emergency medical services, 
coronary care units, and surgical and medical treatment.  Each domain was 
divided into specific interventions which could be quantified with data from 
observational studies and then reassembled using simple arithmetic to calculate 
the number of lives saved.  Similar calculations revealed the contributions of 
lifestyle interventions against dietary fat, cholesterol, smoking, obesity, and 
exercise.  The authors celebrated when the interventions that they modeled -- 
four treatment, four prevention -- combined to account for 90% of the decline 
between 1968 and 1976, a finding they confessed “may be as serendipitous as it 
is accurate.”19 
  Simon Capewell, a Scottish cardiologist and epidemiologist, developed an 
elaborate version of this model in the 1990s.  IMPACT quantified the utilization 
and impact of a given intervention, correcting for interactions between 
interventions, to calculate the total number of deaths prevented by each.  
Capewell demonstrated his model on Scottish data and found that of the deaths 
prevented between 1975 and 1994, 36% could be attributed to decreased 
smoking, 10% to acute coronary care, 9% to treatment of hypertension, and so   9 
forth.  Taken together, “risk factor reductions and modern treatments contributed 
almost equally,” 40% treatment, 51% prevention.20  Collaborating with 
researchers in many countries, Capewell conducted similar analyses -- with 
similar findings -- on countries from Australia to Finland. 
  Modeling has since become a popular tool in cardiovascular epidemiology, 
applied both to explain past declines and to predict future possibilities.  A 2006 
review found 75 articles that used 42 different models to inform CHD policy.21  
But models, like surveillance programs, have certain limitations.  First, models 
must make simplifying assumptions to facilitate methodical analysis.  Second, the 
models can be run with different endpoints, and these choices have substantial 
consequences for how the models allocate credit.  Third, since models can only 
analyze factors that have been quantified and measured, they often exclude 
relevant variables such as stress or socioeconomic status from their analyses.  
Finally, since the models have generally shared credit between risk factor 
reduction and medical care -- a finding that might be both accurate and expedient 
-- they have not provided guidance to policy makers facing difficult choices about 
resource allocation.22  The analyses often end like the Caucus-Race in Alice in 
Wonderland, in which the Dodo Bird, officiating, declared that “everybody has 
won, and all must have prizes.”23 
  Despite its overall celebratory tone, the modeling literature, like the 
surveillance literature, came to include a sense of regret.  Even as models 
accounted for decline, they showed the substantial unrealized potential of both 
prevention and treatment.  A modest increase in the utilization of evidence-based   10 
medical interventions could prevent an additional 41,000 deaths annually in 
Sweden.24  An additional 372,000 deaths could be prevented if Americans 
achieved “ideal risk-factor levels” not yet attained by four decades of public 
health education.25  Even though researchers presumably knew that such 
utopian lifestyles would never be achieved, they sought to inspire many readers 
with statements of hope: if we did more, then even more lives could be saved.  
But the projections could demoralize readers as evidence of unfulfilled promise: 
look how much better things could already be.  The balance between these 
narratives began to tilt in the late 1980s as the rate of decline slowed and 
threatened to reverse. 
 
Recognition of Reversal 
  Surveillance programs provided the first warnings. When Millicent Higgins 
and Thomas Thom presented data from the United States at the 1988 NHLBI 
workshop on international comparisons, they showed that the rate of decline had 
dropped from 4% in the late 1970s to 3% in the 1980s, a concerning trend 
accompanied by a rise in obesity.26  The situation was even worse in Finland.  
Finland had gained notoriety from having the highest rates of CHD mortality in 
the world.  Health officials responded aggressively in the 1970s and implemented 
regional demonstration projects (e.g., the North Karelia project) and national 
campaigns to reduce risk factors, especially dairy fat.27  These efforts yielded 
steep declines in CHD mortality by the late 1970s.  But when Tuomilehto and 
colleagues presented Finnish data (national and MONICA) at the 1988 NHLBI   11 
workshop, they admitted that “this favourable trend may have levelled off during 
the 1980s.”  Finnish officials blamed a risk factor “relapse”: “After an intensive 
active period the public may have lost interest. The tobacco and food industries, 
among others, have taken advantage of this loss of interest. Health professionals 
and lay people may not fully realize that prevention of mass diseases is an 
extremely long process. Many people and practitioners may have lost interest in 
anti-smoking advice, dietary counselling, and other preventive measures, 
especially as countermessages and competing ideas have arisen.”28 
  Finland provided the first of many narratives about the vulnerability of 
success.  Speaking at the workshop, Geoffrey Rose warned of two things that 
could go wrong.  First, cardiovascular disease control programs relied on 
continuing political will, and “a premature end to a preventive effort can 
sometimes be followed by swift loss of the ground that had been gained.”  
Second, even when political will remained, populations could tire of the constant 
exhortation.  Rose blamed Finnish backsliding on the “community's boredom with 
an oft-repeated message that has lost its novelty.”29  By the turn of the twenty-
first century, ominous signs continued to accumulate.  The rate of decline in the 
United States slowed again, from 3% to 2.7% in the 1990s.  Adverse trends in 
risk factors dimmed prospects for continuing decline.  One 2000 review 
suggested that “a more pessimistic view would predict an actual increase.”30  
Surveillance programs in other countries picked up similar signs of the 
vulnerability of continuing decline.  In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, 
decline had slowed and -- possibly -- even stopped and begun to reverse.31   12 
  No single narrative of risk and reversal received more attention than the 
alarming increase in childhood obesity.  In a 2001 JAMA review, obesity 
researchers David Ludwig and Cara Ebbeling warned of the linked increase in 
obesity and Type II diabetes in American children.  This “impending crisis” 
distorted conventional understandings of the normal and pathological, challenged 
notions of epidemiological progress, and shook fundamental associations 
between youth and health on one hand, and aging and chronic disease on the 
other.32  Four years later Ludwig teamed up with Chicago sociologist and 
demographer Jay Olshansky to issue an even more dire warning in the New 
England Journal of Medicine.  Obesity, which increased the risk of death from 
diabetes, heart disease, and cancer, had increased by 50% since the 1960s.  
Their models suggested that this had already blunted the century-long rise in life 
expectancy.  If the trend continued, life expectancy might actually start to 
decrease: “Forecasting life expectancy by extrapolating from the past is like 
forecasting the weather on the basis of its history.  Looking out the window, we 
see a threatening storm -- obesity -- that will, if unchecked, have a negative effect 
on life expectancy.”33 
  The forecasts about future life expectancies remain controversial.  Unlike 
the original decline debate, in which researchers accepted the reality of CHD 
decline and debated its causes, here the trend itself remains contested.  Some 
prominent demographers continue to predict a future of ever-longer lifespans.34  
For Olshansky and Ludwig, however, the optimism born of decades of progress   13 
against CHD needed to be reassessed: “major threats to the health and longevity 
of younger generations today are already visible.”35 
  Meanwhile, the increasing granularity of surveillance programs and the 
increasing power of computer analyses facilitated detailed subgroup analyses 
that could detect subtle developments that would otherwise have been hidden 
within overall trends.  Capewell’s team, for instance, began to combine 
surveillance data and modeling techniques to detect such warning signs.  Using 
a “joinpoint” algorithm they detected shifts in the slope of mortality trajectories in 
specific population sub-groups.  Among men aged 35 to 54 in the United States, 
the annual rate of decline fell from 6.2% in the 1980s to 0.5% in the 2000s, a 
disquieting “sentinel event,” a warning that “hard-fought gains in mortality 
improvements might be arrested or even reversed.”36  The IMPACT modelers 
found similar warnings wherever they looked: England and Wales, Scotland, the 
Netherlands, and Australia all showed attenuation of decline, plateauing, and 
even reversal in some sub-groups.37 
  Having identified concerning trajectories, Capewell used IMPACT to 
explore potential causes.  The model showed that the potential benefit from 
favorable trends in some factors was increasingly offset by adverse trends in 
others.  In the United States, for instance, the contribution to the decline from 
improvements in cholesterol (24%), blood pressure (20%), and smoking (12%) 
were attenuated by adverse changes in obesity (8%) and diabetes (10%).38  Why 
had this happened?  Capewell’s analysis echoed that offered by Rose at the 
1988 workshop: dissipation of political will and fatigue from prolonged campaigns   14 
for risk factor reduction.39  Such complacency threatened to undue decades of 
progress: “mortality rates among younger adults may represent the leading edge 
of a brewing storm.”40 
  Even as projections of future life expectancies remain controversial, 
reports about slowed and stopped decline continue to accumulate.  These are 
descriptive claims, made visible through precise analyses.  Although surveillance 
data have their limitations, the trajectories and inflections revealed by joinpoint 
analyses may be more robust than the specific mortality rates.  Moreover, the 
ominous trends have found easy acceptance among researchers and popular 
media accustomed to reports of a United States population increasingly afflicted 
with chronic disease, backsliding on the prevention and management of 
cardiovascular risk factors, and likely to live shorter, sicker lives than those of 
their parents.41 
 
Globalizing the Epidemic 
  Pessimistic narratives about the future course of CHD in the United States 
have likely been amplified by contemporaneous changes in CHD in other 
countries.  Even as monitoring and modeling revealed the vulnerability of CHD in 
wealthy countries, more concerning developments rose to prominence in Russia, 
China, and elsewhere.  The dynamics of cardiovascular epidemiology vary in 
these countries, and the resulting stories of resurgence or emergence have 
different causes and meanings.  Nonetheless, each case has contributed to the   15 
growing fear of what the future of CHD might be in a world of increasing 
economic turbulence. 
  Russia offered a stark example of how quickly decades of health progress 
could collapse.  Post-war improvements in health conditions had brought life 
expectancy in the Soviet Union to within 2.5 years of the standard set by the 
United States by the 1960s.  Yet by the mid-1980s the failures of the Soviet 
economy, so successfully hidden from the gaze of Western powers, were evident 
in Soviet bodies.42  When Soviet researchers presented at the 1988 NHLBI 
workshop, they noted that age adjusted mortality had increased in the 1980s, 
mostly due to CHD.43  The collapse of the Soviet Union exacerbated the problem.  
Between 1990 and 1994 life expectancy in post-Soviet Russia fell by five years; 
more than one quarter of this was attributed to an increase in mortality from CHD 
and stroke.44  In a striking echo of earlier explanations of decline, there was no 
shortage of possible causes for the new increase: social and economic instability, 
increased alcohol and tobacco use, worsening diet (more fat, fewer fruits and 
vegetables), stress and depression, and an unraveling health care system.  “The 
lesson for the Russian health care system,” researchers concluded, “is the same 
as for the health care system of the United States or other industrialized 
countries: current levels of life expectancy should not be considered permanent.  
Life expectancy can decline and under unusual circumstances those declines 
can be rapid and substantial.”45 
  As economic disruption fueled resurgent CHD in Russia, economic 
development brought emergent CHD to China.  Chinese researchers had   16 
described low rates of CHD at the 1988 workshop in spite of high rates of 
smoking -- a finding attributed to the extraordinary qualities of a Chinese diet 
traditionally low in saturated fat and cholesterol.46  But CHD mortality increased 
by 50% in Chinese men between 1984 and 1999.  IMPACT, using data from 
MONICA, attributed 77% of the extra deaths to increased cholesterol, the result 
of “an increasingly ‘Western’ diet.”47  Mortality jumped another 40% by 2010.48 
  By the turn of the twenty-first century, overwhelming evidence indicated 
that the forces of global social change -- urbanization, industrialization, migration, 
and economic instability -- were transforming populations worldwide and 
threatening a dramatic expansion of CHD.  As Indian cardiologist Srinath Reddy 
described, these changes “propelled the developing countries into the vortex of 
the global CVD epidemic.”49  By the 1990s CHD had become the leading cause 
of death in most countries worldwide.50  Between 1980 and 2000 the prevalence 
of CHD in urban India increased 6- to 8-fold.51  Projections of future disease and 
mortality suggest that the problem of CHD will only get worse.52 
  In an attempt to draw attention and resources to this problem, the World 
Heart Federation identified CHD as an “impending global pandemic” in 2000.53  
Over the subsequent decade, concern not just with CHD but with non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) more broadly has developed into a robust 
movement within global health.  Inspired by successes against HIV and 
tuberculosis (e.g., the President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief, the Global 
Fund, etc.), NCD advocates called for similar efforts against heart disease and 
cancer.  Their advocacy led to the September 2011 United Nations General   17 
Assembly devoted to the prevention and control of NCDs.54  Despite decades of 
decline in the west, CHD -- resurgent in the United States, Australia, or Russia, 
and emergent in China, India, and elsewhere -- now generates rising concern.  
We call this widespread concern over the retreat of progress public health 
catastrophism. 
 
Infectious Precedents of Public Health Catastrophism 
  The ominous tone in the cardiovascular epidemiology at the turn of the 
twenty-first century was not the first time that a literature born of triumphalist 
celebration transmogrified into one of catastrophism and fear.  That story had just 
played out in the discourse on infectious disease.  The parallels between these 
narratives have many possible causes.  They might reflect simple coincidence, 
they might reflect an underlying malaise, or they might have amplified one 
another.  In at least some cases, however, the concerns about resurgent 
infectious disease provided a direct precedent for the concerns that soon 
followed about CHD. 
  From the heady optimism of the early antibiotic era in the 1950s to the 
eradication of smallpox in the 1970s, many physicians and researchers 
celebrated the “conquest” of infectious disease.55  The success fueled the 
emergence of powerful narratives that linked health conditions to economic 
development.  According to theories of the “epidemiological transition,” societies 
passed through progressive stages of epidemiological development, from an age 
of epidemics, to an age of chronic disease, and hopefully towards a future of   18 
better health.56  Since progress involved skills (e.g., sanitation, immunization, 
medical care) that, once learned, would never be forgotten, the transitions should 
be unidirectional.  There should be no turning back the epidemiological clock. 
  Theories of epidemiological transition immediately raised a crucial 
question: what determinants truly caused changing demographic patterns of 
disease, mortality, and fertility?  The fiercest debates focused on responsibility 
for the decline of tuberculosis from Europe and the United States between 1850 
and 1950.  Many observers assumed that biomedical science had played a 
decisive role.  Physician-demographer Thomas McKeown rejected this 
consensus and argued that neither medicine nor public health had contributed to 
the decline of tuberculosis.  Instead, he credited non-specific improvements in 
economic conditions and the standard of living.  His critiques triggered a battle 
royal in the 1970s about the relative contributions of medicine, public health, and 
economic growth.57  Ivan Illich took this critique further and argued that medicine 
was worse than unhelpful: it was a “nemesis” that undermined human freedom.58 
  It is now clear that there were important problems with the basic 
assumptions of the models of epidemiological transitions, and with rise-and-fall 
triumphalist narratives more broadly.  First, the narratives necessarily simplified 
the actual history.  In the United States, for instance, the epidemiological 
transition followed a different time course for different populations (e.g., for men 
vs. women, blacks vs. whites, urban populations vs. rural, etc.).59  Second, even 
though the transition models were explicitly comparative (e.g., juxtaposing the 
timing of transition in England, Japan, Chile, and Sri Lanka), they remained   19 
Eurocentric.  They assumed that all other countries would follow the basic path 
set by England and the United States.  Because the populations in low- and 
middle-income countries were so heterogeneous, the “transition” unfolded in 
complex ways.  Writing from the vantage of Mexico in 1989, Julio Frenk 
characterized this as the problem of a mixed epidemiological transition.60  Partial 
economic development brought great wealth to some populations in middle-
income countries, while leaving others mired in poverty.  The result was the 
emergence of CHD and other “modern diseases” in the wealthy elites even as 
famine, tuberculosis, and other epidemics continued to assail the poor.  
Extrapolating from the past to the present and future might prove just as difficult.  
Changes in medical technology and in risk factor prevalence might have altered 
disease dynamics, making past precedents less relevant.  As MONICA 
researchers wrote in 2000, “Trends in the prevalence of obesity and the global 
spread of tobacco use are reasons to expect that the past will not predict the 
future.”61 
  Even as critiques from the 1980s into the 2000s challenged the meanings 
of Eurocentric narratives of progress, the triumphalist assumptions of the 
narratives themselves began to unravel.  Fears of antibiotic resistance appeared 
in the 1940s and 1950s, within the first decade of antibiotic use.62  They re-
emerged with the outbreak of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in prisons and 
homeless shelters in New York City in the early 1990s.63  Soon anxieties about 
new “superbugs” from the exotic (i.e., Ebola, Marburg, and “flesh-eating 
bacteria”) to the mundane (i.e., methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and   20 
vancomycin-resistant enterococcus) eroded the old progressivist histories.  The 
imprint of these fears can be seen in the string of Hollywood hits from Outbreak 
and 12 Monkeys (both in 1995), to 28 Days Later (2002) and Contagion (2011).  
These pop narratives had echoes in the scholarly literatures of sociology, 
anthropology, history, public health, and national security policy.64  Indeed this 
counter-discourse about resurgent epidemics is now so common that one 
hesitates to call it a counter-discourse at all.  As Nicholas King points out, the 
stock characters in the narratives of emerging infectious disease had, by the 
closing decades of the twentieth century, become part of a commonplace 
sensibility of fall and rise that characterizes a broad retreat from mid-twentieth 
century modernist narratives of progress.65 
  The resurgences were all the more disarming because epidemiologists 
had not foreseen them.  Writing on the eve of the millennium, researchers at the 
CDC described their lost confidence: “Until recently, it was assumed that the 
epidemiologic transition had brought about a permanent reduction in infectious 
disease mortality in the United States.  However, the emergence or reemergence 
in the 1980s of such diseases as the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) and tuberculosis demonstrated that gains against infectious diseases 
cannot be taken for granted.”66  But once the dynamics of this resurgence had 
been characterized, researchers had no trouble tweaking their narratives to 
account for what had happened.  Initial success had led to a relaxation of 
attention and effort that let infectious diseases regain (or secure) their foothold.  
And once physicians and researchers had recognized the resurgence of   21 
infectious disease, they were primed to detect resurgent disease in other 
domains. 
 
Linked Narratives of Catastrophism  
  The parallels between the literatures on the rise, fall, and rise again of 
communicable and non-communicable disease are especially evident in the 
cross-linked trajectories of tuberculosis and CHD.67 Both were epidemics in slow 
motion, building not over months but over decades.  Tuberculosis rose to 
prominence in the mid-nineteenth century, peaked around 1900, and then 
declined substantially by 1950 in Europe and the United States.  CHD followed a 
similar trajectory, just shifted fifty years later.  Political linkages also exist.  When 
CHD rose to prominence in the early twentieth century, advocacy groups looked 
specifically to tuberculosis as the exemplar for how to draw attention and 
resources to a health problem.  The new American Heart Association studied the 
experience of the National Tuberculosis Association as it designed its early 
campaigns against heart disease in the 1930s and 1940s.  Similar links exist 
today.  Olshansky and Ludwigs’s 2005 warning about obesity and life expectancy 
placed CHD into the broader context of the many new threats to public health, 
including HIV, hospital-acquired infections, and antibiotic resistance.68  Before 
teaming up with Ludwig, Olshanksy himself had written extensively about the 
threat of new and re-emerging infectious diseases.69 
  Parallels also exist in the debates that emerged about the declines of 
tuberculosis and CHD.  Speakers at the Decline Conference in 1978 worked in   22 
the shadow of the McKeown debates.  They explicitly invoked Illich as a warning 
to those who would take the value of medicine for granted.  “Lest the physician 
become preoccupied with the importance of his or her efforts in altering the 
course of [CHD],” one speaker warned, “it should be appreciated that there are 
some who will credit neither surgeons nor cardiologists with changes in the 
course of the disease.”70  While each of the decline debates focused on medicine 
versus public health, critics worked to broaden the discussion.  McKeown 
focused on socioeconomic conditions in his account of the decline of tuberculosis.  
Such factors remain on the sidelines of the CHD debates, as neither the 
surveillance programs nor the epidemiological models generated the data that 
would have been needed for these factors to become serious players in the 
debates.  Lost in each debate was recognition of how much the category of 
public health has changed.  For both tuberculosis and CHD, prior commitments 
to broad, community-based intervention have increasingly given way to 
prevention through regimes of medical surveillance and pharmaceutical control.71 
 
Managing Expectations: Between Triumph and Tragedy 
  The linked debates about the decline of infectious and non-infectious 
disease and the parallel fears of resurgence demonstrate the importance of 
setting narratives of expectation for how researchers and societies respond to 
public health data.  Since the 1990s, scholars in science studies have studied the 
sociology of expectations, showing how scientists’ claims and speculations about 
the promise of science help them to attract funding and recruit allies and these, in   23 
turn, shape future science and policy.72  This is best demonstrated in genetics, 
the archetypal “promissory science” of the new millennium: promises about how 
genetics will revolutionize medicine, more than actual contributions of genetics to 
clinical practice, have motivated the substantial social and scientific commitment 
to the science.73 
  It is easy to see how expectations have had a substantial impact on the 
linked discourses of decline and resurgence.  Even though the impacts of AIDS 
and CHD have been profound, each killing tens of millions of people, many of the 
hyped threats are startlingly subtle.  The much discussed epidemic of 
tuberculosis in New York City in the 1990s involved a few thousand cases, some 
of which were multi-drug resistant.  This is a far cry from the millions killed by 
tuberculosis during its heyday in the United States (or the millions who die each 
year worldwide).  The concern over the slowed or plateaued decline of CHD 
mortality rates remains a blip in an overall trajectory of dramatic and continuing 
decline in CHD, whether in Finland or the United States.  The subtle signals were 
only detected because of the substantial efforts in surveillance and modeling that 
had been created, ironically, to characterize the success story of CHD decline.  
How is it that subtle signals come to take on such great significance in the public 
health discourse? 
  First, the models -- whether of epidemiological transitions or CHD 
trajectories -- project trends into the future.  This is often a suspect science, in 
which slight changes in assumptions lead to substantial differences in projected 
futures.  But the models still have great narrative power.  A small signal,   24 
amplified over time, can become a substantial threat.  This poses a real 
challenge for policy makers.  Should they respond to the magnitude of the 
problem now experienced, or should they trust the models and plan 
prophylactically to manage a future that might come into being?  There are no 
easy answers. 
  Second, the resurgence of both infectious and non-infectious disease 
scored a double-hit against modernist assumptions.  By the 1970s the narratives 
of progressive conquest of disease had saturated commonsense understandings 
and informed an ontology that linked disease, medicine, public health, and 
economic and political development.  Everyone expected that this conquest 
would continue.  However, by the 1990s, excitement over post-Cold War 
globalization had given way to new kinds of catastrophism, of economic neo-
colonialism, of erosion of traditional cultures and values, and of emerging threats 
to public health.  Shattered expectations have had a profound impact.  When a 
population has settled into an expectation of continued, inevitable decline, then 
even the subtlest deviation from the narrative becomes concerning. 
  Third, the offended expectations take on broader significance because 
they become linked to questions of identity and national pride.  Health officials in 
the United States, which rarely leads the world in any health indicator, have long 
celebrated the status of the United States as the country that has led the decline 
in CHD.  Early signals of reversal threaten this status: the United States might 
become the poster child not of the conquest of CHD but of its resurgence.   25 
  Finally, expectations and their management shape the political 
imagination of possible responses.  Many within the infectious disease 
community have mobilized the discourse of “emerging infectious diseases” and 
bioterrorism into an activist response: we had defeated infectious diseases once 
before, and we can do it again -- as long as we provide researchers, physicians, 
and first-responders with suitable resources.74  This move transforms a warning 
into a call for action, even an opportunity.  Something similar happens with CHD.  
Researchers invoke catastrophist narratives, issue dire warnings, and demand 
greater resources for both prevention and treatment.  The concern about 
prevention fatigue demonstrates this as well.  Advocates warn that we have the 
power to control CHD, we just need the individual motivation and the political will 
to implement the needed reforms.  That fact that we had made so much progress 
in the past affirms what we could do in the future.  The recollection of past 
triumph functions as an inspiration for future action that salves the injury caused 
by the reversals.  The question is whether CHD and other NCDs will motivate the 
powerful societal responses engendered by smallpox, tuberculosis, and other 
pathogens.  Efforts at risk factor reduction will likely collide with the interests of 
the multinational corporations that produce and market tobacco and food.  If this 
happens, then differences in the willingness and ability of governments to 
implement effective public health and medical programs will exacerbate existing 
health inequalities.75 
  Public health narratives link data to action because they focus attention on 
particular problems.  What does the future of tuberculosis and CHD hold?  The   26 
answer depends on how the narratives are framed and the extent to which 
catastrophist visions take root.  If scholars focus on the overall experience of 
populations in developed countries, then the long term trajectories are still ones 
of conquest over infections and CHD: mortality from both sets of diseases is 
dramatically lower now than in the past.  If they focus on select populations within 
those countries, then signs of possible reversal rise to prominence, foretelling a 
possible future of increasing mortality rates.  If they focus on developing 
countries, then they find epidemics of epidemics and CHD in full swing.  All three 
narratives are relevant for public health policy.  It is essential for policy makers to 
understand the stakes and interests behind them before they formulate their 
responses.  Policy makes must recognize that the public health narratives we 
produce, whether progressive or catastrophist, are highly dependent upon 
subject position and envisioned audience.  An ongoing and critical task for the 
social sciences of health will be to attend to which of these narrative wins out in 
the struggle to set global health priorities in the near future. 
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